Skip to content

Autonomous MCP AI Agents ​

A standardized STDIO Model Context Protocol server for Claude, Cursor, Gemini and autonomous trading agents — with a read-only-by-default surface, two-phase execution and atomic, file-locked spending policies between the agent and your money.

Start the server ​

bash
# TS execution server — market data, finance views, oracle/Solana reads,
# and (only with --enable-execution) the policy-gated execution tools
furlpay mcp --wallet agent-alpha

# JS research server — fork registry, microstructure, algo engines
furlpay mcp

Claude Desktop / Cursor configuration:

json
{
  "mcpServers": {
    "furlpay-execution": {
      "command": "furlpay",
      "args": ["mcp", "--wallet", "agent-alpha"]
    }
  }
}

Read-only is the default

A fresh furlpay mcp cannot move funds. Every value-moving tool is structurally ABSENT from tools/list — not merely refused at call time — and a direct call of a known mutating tool errors with EXECUTION_MODE_REQUIRED. Execution requires --enable-execution AND an already-configured agent policy; the server refuses to start in execution mode (exit 47) without one.

Issue a delegated spending policy (do this first) ​

bash
furlpay wallet agent-keygen \
  --name agent-alpha \
  --daily-limit 50.00 \
  --single-tx-cap 10.00 \
  --allowed-assets USDC,BTC,ETH,HYPE \
  --expiry 7d

The two-phase execution protocol ​

Even with --enable-execution, mutating tools cannot be called directly:

  1. Preview — furlpay_preview_execution { tool, args } sanitizes the arguments, binds them to a one-time executionHash, and returns the net effect. It executes nothing.
  2. Confirm — furlpay_confirm_execution { executionHash } executes the STORED arguments: single-use, 10-minute TTL. The agent policy gate re-runs on the stored amount, so a confirm call can never smuggle a bigger number past the spend caps.

Direct dispatch of a mutating tool errors with TWO_PHASE_REQUIRED — in read-only mode with a pointer to the mode, in execution mode with a pointer to the protocol.

The mandate lifecycle ​

When an agent previews then confirms a value-moving tool (furlpay_trade_perp, furlpay_sweep_treasury, furlpay_settle_invoice, …):

  1. An exclusive OS file lock is acquired on the policy file (O_EXCL create; stale locks break after 30s).
  2. The daily spend window rolls over at 00:00 UTC.
  3. Single-transaction cap, daily limit, asset whitelist and expiry are evaluated.
  4. The spend is recorded atomically in the same locked transaction — concurrent tool calls cannot both pass against a stale snapshot.
  5. Any limit breach, revoked key or expired policy fails closed.

The daily-spend ledger is persistent — restarting the process does not reset the counters or permit replay. Mutating MCP calls are additionally rate-limited (30/min rolling default) and attempts count even when refused.

Human-in-the-loop ​

All mutating tools are declared with _meta: { "anthropic/requiresUserInteraction": true }, so Claude / Cursor prompts you with an interactive confirmation showing order size, price and leverage before anything is signed.

Exposed tools ​

TS execution server (35 tools, furlpay mcp --wallet <name>) — see the CLI reference for the full list. Highlights:

  • Always read-only: furlpay_get_market_data / furlpay_get_orderbook / furlpay_get_funding / furlpay_market_search, furlpay_positions / furlpay_open_orders / furlpay_portfolio_risk / furlpay_preview_trade (executes nothing), furlpay_get_rwa_assets / furlpay_get_rwa_quote (SEP-8 never claimed), furlpay_get_hlp_yield (live-derived or null — never fabricated), furlpay_balance (sample data, flagged simulated: true in unauthenticated mode), the finance views (furlpay_finance_overview / furlpay_finance_ledger / furlpay_finance_spend / furlpay_finance_treasury / furlpay_finance_billing / furlpay_finance_payments — MCP can inspect money, never authorize its movement), furlpay_oracle_price, furlpay_solana_cluster_status.
  • Hidden by default, two-phase when enabled: furlpay_settle_invoice (x402, labeled SIMULATED), furlpay_trade (Stellar, simulated), furlpay_trade_perp (Hyperliquid L1 perps, LIVE signed), furlpay_execute_trade / furlpay_cancel_order / furlpay_emergency_stop / furlpay_pay, furlpay_sweep_treasury (HLP target is a real signed vault transfer; FOBXX target is labeled simulated — and a missing amountUsd is refused, never defaulted).

JS research server (29 tools, plain furlpay mcp): fork_list_networks / fork_inspect_network / fork_replay_check, microstructure_analytics / microstructure_vpin / microstructure_quotes, algo_glft_quotes / algo_breakeven / algo_cascade — read-only research, plus the same read-only-default gating on its value-moving tools.

Prompt-injection example ​

An attacker tricks the LLM into "place a $100k long on BTC-PERP":

  • In read-only mode the tool does not exist on the server at all — the call errors with EXECUTION_MODE_REQUIRED.
  • In execution mode the preview is built, but the confirm's policy gate rejects the order before any request is signed ($100,000 > $10 single-tx cap).
  • requiresUserInteraction surfaces the attempt to you for [y/N].
  • The per-call audit log records the refusal — raw untrusted arguments never enter the log, only their hash.

The agent can only ever do what the policy allows — the model's instructions are not authority.

FurlPay CLI is non-custodial software. Every execution surface is labeled live or simulated at runtime.