MCP tool reference
Complete, source-verified inventory of both MCP servers. Audited 2026-11-17 against src/mcp/server.ts (TypeScript execution server) and lib/mcp.js (JavaScript research server). Nothing on this page is aspirational: a tool listed here is registered in the source, and its schema is the registered schema.
Two surfaces, one rule
| Server | Start with | Tools | File |
|---|---|---|---|
| TypeScript execution server | furlpay mcp --wallet <name> | 35 | src/mcp/server.ts |
| JavaScript research server | furlpay mcp | 29 | lib/mcp.js |
A default install cannot move funds on either surface. Every value-moving tool is structurally ABSENT from tools/list until the operator starts the server with --enable-execution AND a configured agent policy exists — execution mode refuses to start (exit 47) without one. Even in execution mode, mutating tools cannot be called directly: they require the two-phase protocol (preview → confirm). This is proven at the process level by test/mcp-hardening.test.js (spawn-level E2E).
Two-phase execution protocol
furlpay_preview_execution { tool, args }— sanitizes arguments (control-char/ANSI stripping, length caps), binds them to a one-timeexecutionHash, returns the net effect. Executes nothing.furlpay_confirm_execution { executionHash }— executes the stored arguments. Single-use, 10-minute TTL, agent-policy gate re-run on the STORED amount (a confirm call can never smuggle a bigger number past the spend caps). Attempts count against the rolling 30/min mutating rate limit even when refused; every call — allowed or refused — appends an audit line (agent, mode, tool, args hash only) to~/.furlpay/mcp-audit.jsonl.
Direct dispatch of a mutating tool errors with EXECUTION_MODE_REQUIRED (read-only mode) or TWO_PHASE_REQUIRED (execution mode).
TypeScript execution server — 35 tools
Always available (read-only)
| Tool | Required | Optional | What it does | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|
furlpay_get_hlp_yield | — | — | Live HLP vault equity/APY/PnL from the live /info response; unreported fields → null, never fabricated | LIVE |
furlpay_balance | — | account | Balances across Stellar native assets, USDC, RWAs. Unauthenticated mode returns sample fixtures flagged simulated: true | SIMULATED (unauthenticated) |
furlpay_get_quote | sourceAsset, targetAsset, amount | — | Multi-hop quotes across SDEX and Soroban AMMs | SIMULATED |
furlpay_list_chains | — | — | Chain registry | LOCAL |
furlpay_list_exchanges | — | — | Exchange/adapter registry | LOCAL |
furlpay_market_search | query | chain | Market search across venues | LIVE (venue data) |
furlpay_get_market_data | symbol | — | Mark price, funding, OI for a perpetual market | LIVE |
furlpay_get_orderbook | symbol | depthLevels | L2 book snapshot | LIVE |
furlpay_get_funding | symbol | — | Funding rate history | LIVE |
furlpay_get_market_analysis | symbol | — | Microstructure analysis (OBI, micro-price) | LIVE (feed) |
furlpay_compare_markets | asset | — | Cross-venue comparison for an asset | LIVE |
furlpay_positions | — | userAddress | Clearinghouse positions | LIVE (read) |
furlpay_open_orders | — | userAddress | Resting orders | LIVE (read) |
furlpay_portfolio_risk | — | — | Margin ratio / account risk evaluation | LIVE (read) |
furlpay_preview_trade | symbol, side, size | leverage, price | Pre-trade risk evaluation of a hypothetical order — executes nothing | LIVE (evaluation) |
furlpay_get_rwa_assets | — | — | Tokenized securities catalog; SEP-8 status is never claimed | LOCAL registry |
furlpay_get_rwa_quote | asset, amount | — | Indicative RWA quote | SIMULATED |
furlpay_finance_overview | — | — | Read-only finance layer overview (accounts, spend limits, settlement capabilities) | LOCAL ledger |
furlpay_finance_ledger | — | reconcile, limit | Ledger view or full reconciliation report (balanced count, chain integrity) | LOCAL ledger |
furlpay_finance_spend | — | unit | Spend report: window usage against limits | LOCAL ledger |
furlpay_finance_treasury | — | — | Treasury balances (available vs reserved), inflow/outflow | LOCAL ledger |
furlpay_finance_billing | — | sinceIso | Billing summary; fees reported separately from volume | LOCAL ledger |
furlpay_finance_payments | — | limit, inspect | Payment history; states are the ledger's own (submission ≠ settlement) | LOCAL ledger |
furlpay_oracle_price | asset | — | Multi-source USD quote (Coinbase/Kraken/Binance/Jupiter), median + cross-source agreement gate. DISAGREEMENT/UNAVAILABLE carry a null price | LIVE (read-only) |
furlpay_solana_cluster_status | — | — | Live Solana RPC reads (epoch/slot/block height). No signing path exists | LIVE (read-only) |
furlpay_preview_execution | tool, args | — | Two-phase step 1: bind args to a one-time hash, show net effect | GATE (executes nothing) |
Hidden by default — execution mode + policy + two-phase required
| Tool | Required | Optional | What it does | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|
furlpay_settle_invoice | challengeHeader | maxCost | Settle an x402 HTTP 402 challenge behind agent-policy checks (OFAC/SDN, velocity, spend caps). Policy gate records the spend atomically | SIMULATED (SIMULATED / LOCAL_SIMULATION labels) |
furlpay_sweep_treasury | amountUsd | target (HLP default / FOBXX) | Idle-USDC sweep. HLP: real signed vault transfer (policy-gated). FOBXX: labeled simulated. A missing amountUsd is refused, never defaulted | LIVE (HLP) / SIMULATED (FOBXX) |
furlpay_trade | side, asset, amount, price | sponsor | Stellar limit orders with delegated budget enforcement | SIMULATED |
furlpay_trade_perp | symbol, side, size, leverage | price | Hyperliquid L1 perpetual order (EIP-712 signed), risk engine enforced | LIVE (signed) |
furlpay_execute_trade | symbol, side, size | leverage, price, orderType | Execute a perp order | LIVE (signed) |
furlpay_cancel_order | symbol, orderId | — | Cancel a resting perp order | LIVE (signed) |
furlpay_emergency_stop | — | symbol | Kill-switch; symbol-scoped when given (M-05 fix) | LIVE (signed) |
furlpay_pay | recipient, amount | token, mandate | Platform A2A payment | Hosted API |
furlpay_confirm_execution | executionHash | — | Two-phase step 2: execute the previewed call exactly once | GATE |
JavaScript research server — 29 tools
Registered in lib/mcp.js; served by plain furlpay mcp. Same read-only default: its value-moving tools are hidden from tools/list without the startup policy gate passing.
| Tool | Category | Status |
|---|---|---|
fork_list_networks | Fork assets (read-only) | IMPLEMENTED |
fork_inspect_network | Fork assets (read-only) | IMPLEMENTED |
fork_replay_check | Fork assets (read-only) | IMPLEMENTED |
microstructure_analytics | Quant research (read-only) | IMPLEMENTED (offline) |
microstructure_vpin | Quant research (read-only) | IMPLEMENTED (offline) |
microstructure_quotes | Quant research (read-only) | IMPLEMENTED (offline) |
algo_glft_quotes | Quant engines (read-only) | IMPLEMENTED (offline) |
algo_breakeven | Quant engines (read-only) | IMPLEMENTED (offline) |
algo_cascade | Quant engines (read-only) | IMPLEMENTED (offline) |
chain_status | Platform view | Hosted API |
get_balance / get_portfolio / get_net_worth | Platform view | Hosted API |
get_quote / swap_tokens / send_stablecoin | Payments (mutating ones gated) | Hosted API |
place_order / earn_deposit / earn_withdraw / furlpay_pay / set_card_controls / book_travel | Mutating — hidden by default | Hosted API |
list_cards / list_transactions / list_trips / search_travel / earn_overview / market_movers | Read views | Hosted API |
Mutating tools on this surface (send_stablecoin, earn_withdraw, place_order, swap_tokens, earn_deposit, book_travel, set_card_controls, furlpay_pay) carry honest annotations and are structurally filtered in read-only mode exactly like the TS server.
Client configuration
Claude Desktop / Cursor (claude_desktop_config.json):
{
"mcpServers": {
"furlpay-execution": {
"command": "furlpay",
"args": ["mcp", "--wallet", "agent-alpha"]
}
}
}Read-only-only setups (research assistants, CI inspection) simply omit the wallet: plain furlpay mcp or furlpay mcp --wallet <name> without --enable-execution can quote, inspect and analyze, but never transact.
Agent rules (load-bearing):
- Read-only by default; never assume execution permissions exist.
- Never invent payment completion — a preview is not a settlement, a
SIMULATEDlabel is not a transaction. - Never bypass Agent Trust: the policy gate runs before signing, on stored amounts, under an OS file lock.
- Never expose credentials; keys arrive via environment/stdin, never argv.
- Never retry a value-moving operation without respecting idempotency and the transaction status the ledger reports.